A lthough diversity provides teams with a variety of advantages, the diversity-performance connection is not always positive. This paper identifies three performance issues that naturally result from diversity and suggests a potential solution for each of them. First, the positive effects associated with diversity often decay over time, in part because heterogeneous people may homogenize with repeated exposure. Second, diverse groups are fragile and experience higher turnover than nondiverse groups. Recruiting similar (redundant) pairs within a heterogeneous group can solve these two problems but also gives rise to a third: fault-line fragmentation. We propose a different structural solution: redundant heterogeneity (RH), in which not only are team members heterogeneous within a hierarchical level of a group or organization but their diversity is matched by similar critical team member characteristics at other hierarchical levels. Thus, we suggest that organizations and teams can take maximal advantage of diversity when each of their hierarchical subgroups are similarly diverse on the same critical dimensions. Analyses of 23 years of panel data from the National Basketball Association provided a first test of the effectiveness of this solution. We focused on professional players' experience with a particular style of play in their college careers as the critical dimension of diversity within these teams. Our findings indicate that RH led to better performance, for three reasons. First, the positive effect of heterogeneity among teams' core players on team performance decays more slowly for teams with RH; second, teams with RH are less negatively affected by turnover among core players; and third, teams with RH exhibited more coordination and cooperation. The discussion section suggests how and why other types of teams and organizations can benefit from redundant heterogeneity.
Introduction
Theories commonly trumpet the benefits of interpersonal heterogeneity throughout the social, organizational, and managerial sciences. Although these theories vary in how they conceptualize heterogeneity and its underlying mechanisms, as well as the importance of context, their collective narrative is compelling. Specifically, they suggest that interpersonal heterogeneity leads to creative problem solving and enhanced performance (e.g., Bantel and Jackson 1989 , Hambrick et al. 1996 , Hoffman and Maier 1961 , McLeod et al. 1996 , Mannix and Neale 2005 by expanding a group's perspectives and improving the quality of its ideas (e.g., Hoffman 1979, Milliken and Martins 1996) through extended search (e.g., Bantel and Jackson 1989 , Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990 , Hastie 1986 , Wiersema and Bantel 1992 and enhanced collaborative memory (Gigone and Hastie 1993 , Hastie 1986 , Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin 2010 . Some research has even suggested that interpersonal heterogeneity is more important than individual ability (e.g., Hong and Page 2004) .
Unfortunately, these conclusions conflict with a host of empirical findings that suggest that heterogeneous groups, teams, and organizations actually exhibit relatively poor performance. Williams and O'Reilly's (1998) comprehensive review, for instance, not only presents a theoretical critique of the benefits of heterogeneity but also reviews a variety of studies showing that team member diversity is related to elevated turnover and low interpersonal cohesion (Jackson et al. 1991 , O'Reilly et al. 1989 ; see also Milliken and Martins 1996) . The authors of the review conclude that data generally indicate that diversity has a negative effect on group performance. This paper takes on this issue directly, first by conceptualizing the primary failures that result from diversity and second by presenting a potential solution to them. Specifically, we suggest that diversity leads to three basic failures: (1) heterogeneous teams' repeated interactions lead their members to become more homogeneous (i.e., they soon talk alike, think alike, and act alike); (2) diversity makes groups inherently fragile, with relatively high rates of turnover; and (3) heterogeneous teams tend to fragment into homogeneous subgroups.
1 Prior research has typically adopted a singular focus on one or the other of these three failures. Because each of the three can undermine diversity's benefits independently, however, we consider them in unison and try to determine how groups and teams can overcome them, simultaneously, to experience diversity's benefits.
Next we introduce the concept of redundant heterogeneity (RH) and suggest that it can extinguish all three of these failures. We begin by noting that groups and organizations are typically divided into two or more hierarchical levels (Anderson and Brown 2010 , Bantel and Jackson 1989 , Halevy et al. 2012 , Harrison and Klein 2007 , Korn et al. 1992 ) and describe RH as creating interpersonal heterogeneity within these levels and homogeneity between them. For instance, consider a two-level group with its top level including three types of people, A, B, and C, with three sets of unique identities, backgrounds, and knowledge. Groups that include these same three types in their bottom level are high in RH (see Figure 1 ). This structure can emerge in any number of groups, including professional service firms, medical teams, project-based workgroups, or sports teams. It can also depict academic departments of junior and senior faculty, whose doctoral training or research specialties are their key characteristics. Teams contain some homogeneity when two faculty members have comparable doctoral training or research interests. We suggest that this structure is more effective, collectively, when the two faculty members span the junior/senior divide. If a department's senior faculty is heterogeneous on many important dimensions, and this pattern of heterogeneity is also present among the junior faculty, then the department has a high level of RH.
We then develop a set of hypotheses that connect RH and the three failures-homogenization, fragility, and fragmentation-and link them to team performance. To identify and explore the effects of RH empirically, we used panel data on team performance in the National Basketball Association (NBA) for the 1986-2008 seasons. We limited our analyses to the simple case of two hierarchical levels, the primary level composed of players who play frequently as part of the team's regular rotation and the secondary level composed of players playing less frequently and less regularly. We also focused on a single player characteristic-a player's prior exposure to a style of play-to represent the player's knowledge and functional background. Our results indicate that RH is positively related to the number of games that a team wins. We also found that the positive effects of heterogeneity among a team's primary players on team performance decayed more slowly for teams with RH; that teams with RH were less negatively affected by turnover among primary players; and finally, that interpersonal coordination and cooperation partially mediated the effect of RH on performance.
Interpersonal Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is often viewed as the lifeblood of productive and innovative teams, groups, and organizations (Bantel and Jackson 1989 ; see also Mannix and Neale 2005) . Especially in complex environments, heterogeneity enhances the breadth of perspective, improves the quality of ideas, and fosters creativity (Boeker 1997 , Cannella et al. 2008 , Deszo and Ross 2012 , McLeod et al. 1996 , Milliken and Martins 1996 , Van Knippenberg et al. 2004 . Research has shown, for example, that top management teams with heterogeneous educational and functional backgrounds exhibit performance advantages (e.g., Hambrick et al. 1996) because they engage in more comprehensive search, considering both more information and more diverse information (Hastie 1986) . As a result, heterogeneous teams also consider more alternatives and exhibit greater creativity in both their actions and reactions (Bantel and Jackson 1989 , Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990 , Wiersema and Bantel 1992 . Despite these and many other illustrations of the virtues of interpersonal heterogeneity (Mannix and Neale 2005) , research also includes many observations of absent or negative performance effects for heterogeneity (e.g., Eklund et al. 2009 ). Williams and O'Reilly (1998) highlighted some of the most salient examples. In the end, the theoretical benefits of heterogeneity are often difficult to realize because of the complexities of motivating, coordinating, and assimilating heterogeneous people (Greening and Johnson 1997, Hambrick and D'Aveni 1992) . Thus, a critical question concerns whether a group of heterogeneous individuals can be structured to take advantage of the benefits of heterogeneity, both immediately and over time. We begin to answer this question by identifying three primary reasons why heterogeneous groups fail.
The Three Failures of Interpersonal Heterogeneity
Three things must be true for a group of heterogeneous people to sustainably experience the benefits of their heterogeneity. First, people must retain their heterogeneity, holding fast to their idiosyncrasies lest they assimilate others' views and lose the benefits of diversity. Second, heterogeneous groups must be stable enough to withstand shocks. Specifically, they must discourage and survive turnover-especially of people with unique knowledge or skills-by minimizing reliance on any one individual. Finally, the group must be cohesive. Group members must be able to communicate and work together. This suggests that the three primary failures of interpersonal heterogeneity are homogenization, fragility, and fragmentation. Although past research on groups and organizations has focused on each of these failures, they are seldom addressed together. This limits research because, as we will show, these failures are intertwined in unique and complex ways.
Failure 1: Homogenization
We define homogenization as a process in which diverse people begin to resemble one another in thoughts, actions, or knowledge (e.g., Carpenter 2002) . Even the most nascent heterogeneous groups are subject to homogenization as individuals try to get along, thereby minimizing their underlying differences (Kanter 1977 , Schneider 1987 . Homogenization occurs in part as a function of etiquette biases and the "group paradox," i.e., the fact that people's desires to connect with other group members reduces the likelihood that they will share their real opinions, especially when their opinions differ (Berg and Smith 1995 , Bourdieu 1984 , Burt 2007 . Behaviorally, homogenization often results in discussion cascades (Sunstein and Hastie 2008) , groupthink (Bantel and Jackson 1989 , Janis 1972 , Pfeffer 1983 , and an adherence to majority rule or the status quo (Menon and Phillips 2010) . Stasser and Titus (1985) , for example, found that teams tend to discuss previously shared rather than novel information. Stroebe et al. (1992) found that four people working together generated fewer unique solutions to a problem than four people working alone, and Katz (1982) showed that, as longevity increased, group members tended to restrict their communications to in-group members, reducing communication with outsiders, thereby losing them as a source of unique or novel information. Even more pointedly, Watson et al. (1993) found that the performance of heterogeneous groups converged to the performance of homogeneous groups as their collective experience increased. Thus, as teams interact, their members tend to act, think, and behave in increasingly similar ways.
Failure 2: Fragility
The second failure point of heterogeneous groups is their inherent fragility. To illustrate, consider a prototypical, hypothetical three-person group in which knowledge is idiosyncratic to and distributed among group members A, B, and C. If group performance were a function of members' heterogeneity-our guiding scope conditionthen the group is highly dependent on each member, and the loss of any one member could be catastrophic. This poses a real and significant problem for heterogeneous groups because evidence suggests that it is precisely such groups that are most likely to experience interpersonal conflict and psychological unease, ultimately resulting in increased exit and turnover (Jackson et al. 1991 , Milliken and Martins 1996 , O'Reilly et al. 1989 , Wagner et al. 1984 ; see also Smith-Lovin 2007, p. 116).
Simple redundancy-creating a six-person group of two A's, two B's, and two C's-offers a potential solution to Failures 1 and 2. People in like-minded subgroups feel psychologically safer expressing unique opinions (Asch 1952, Gibson and Vermeulen 2003) and may preserve their uniqueness by frequently transferring information among one another (e.g., Kane et al. 2005) . Redundancy thus mitigates the natural process of homogenization. Simple redundancy can also reduce fragility by diminishing the impact of the loss of any one individual-her knowledge will be retained in her redundant counterpart-and by lowering the probability of exit; homogeneous subgroups foster positive feelings of personal satisfaction, motivation, and commitment (Beal et al. 2003 , Cartwright and Zander 1968 , Pfeffer 1983 ).
Failure 3: Fragmentation Unfortunately, simple redundancy also leads to another likely failure point, fragmentation, i.e., the tendency for homogeneous subgroups within larger, heterogeneous groups to form factions and for group separation to occur along these fault lines (Lau and Murnighan 1998) . Fragmentation begins when homophily leads similar people, especially those in otherwise heterogeneous contexts, to disproportionately associate with one another (McPherson et al. 2001) . Blau (1977) depicted the tendency to identify with similar others over the members of the larger group as the most destructive force affecting groups and organizations because homogeneous subgroups create social barriers, heighten the potential for conflict, and constitute a principal impediment of group cohesion (see also Lau and Murnighan 1998, O'Leary and Mortensen 2010) . When group cohesion is undermined, group performance suffers.
Redundant Heterogeneity
To experience and sustain the benefits of interpersonal heterogeneity, a group, team, or organization must resist homogenization, overcome fragility, and prevent fragmentation. As noted, simple redundancy can solve the first two of these objectives, but only as it increases the likelihood of the third. We suggest that RH can solve all three problems simultaneously. To do so, RH takes advantage of fault lines that are both common and expected within teams, groups, and organizations (Cohen and Zhou 1991) , i.e., their hierarchical levels (Carton and Cummings 2012, Harrison and Klein 2007) . This allows homogeneous subgroups to exist without encouraging fragmentation, for several reasons. In our example of the academic department, for instance, two colleagues with overlapping research interests might identify more with each other than with the department at large (e.g., Blau 1977), but this tendency will be less serious when they span the junior/senior boundary because their similar interests are tempered by their different ranks. Thus, although cross-level subgroups continue to present a risk of fragmentation, they should pose a far smaller risk than fragmentation by within-level subgroups.
Hypotheses
By simultaneously addressing the three failures of interpersonal heterogeneity, we expect that RH will enable teams, groups, and organizations to capture many of the benefits of an integrated, cohesive group while at the same time fostering the contributions of diverse skill sets and perspectives. This is our basic hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). RH will have positive effects on group performance.
The causal structure linking RH to group performance involves overcoming each of the three failures. We consider them in order here, beginning with homogenization. We argue that one means for overcoming homogenization is to provide each person with a redundant counterpart. Following Asch (1952) and Gibson and Vermeulen (2003) , we expect that individuals will be more inclined to express their opinions, especially novel opinions, when they have like-minded counterparts in their groups. Without these connections, heterogeneous opinions will surface less, increasing homogenization and potentially undermining diversity's advantages (Azzi 1993) . By creating subgroups of like-minded individuals, RH provides a context for meaningful heterogeneity to be expressed and preserved. Thus, we present our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). RH will slow the decay of interpersonal heterogeneity's positive effects on group performance.
Next we consider fragility, and we propose that teams high in RH should experience fewer of the consequences associated with turnover. Consider an analogy in biology, in which a robust system can maintain functionality in the face of various external and internal perturbations (Kitano 2002, pp. 206-210 ; for examples in organizational research, see Bothner et al. 2010, Moody and White 2003) . We expect that RH will create organizationally robust systems by mitigating the consequences of the loss of a vital team member with the presence of people with similar knowledge who can substitute for lost or otherwise ineffective personnel.
3 This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Disruptions such as the loss of a primary-level member will hurt groups less as their RH increases.
Our final hypothesis concerns fragmentation and hinges on research showing that hierarchal structures in groups and organizations foster social order, reduce intragroup conflict, and facilitate social coordination, thereby improving performance (Halevy et al. 2012) . Interpersonal similarity that spans hierarchical levels should also foster mutualism, mentorship, cooperation, and individual satisfaction (e.g., Vecchio and Bullis 2001) . Thus, we predict that homogeneous subgroups will be less likely to fragment into competing, acrimonious factions when they span hierarchical levels. 4 Thus, we present our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (H4)
. RH reduces the risk of fragmentation and has a positive, indirect effect on group performance via a positive, direct effect on group cohesion. In other words, group cohesion should mediate the positive effects of RH on performance.
Methods
The National Basketball Association To assess our hypotheses, we examined how RH affected the performance of teams in the NBA in the 1986-2008 seasons. The NBA is the world's premiere basketball league, comprising 30 teams (as of 2008) located predominantly in major metropolitan areas in the North America. These data are particularly appropriate for testing our model for several reasons. First, professional basketball is a fertile context for testing the effects of group composition on performance. During the NBA's regular season, teams typically play three to four games each week against opponents located in different cities across North America. Given the intense demands of the NBA season, this context fulfills one of our basic scope conditions, i.e., a complex, uncertain environment. Second, because of the league's popularity and reach, we were able to gather considerable qualitative data in the form of interviews with coaches, players, agents, and media. Third, our measures of team composition-particularly RH-fit naturally in this context, as team members can be easily categorized into primary (frequent players) and secondary (infrequent players) levels. Fourth, data on both teams and individual players are systematic and widely available. (The majority of our data came from http://www .basketball-reference.com and Patricia Bender's Various Basketball Stuff page, http://www.eskimo.com/~pbender/.) Fifth, organizational theories have frequently used sports data, especially from the NBA, to test new constructs and mechanisms (e.g., Berman et al. 2002 , Bothner et al. 2012 , Ethiraj and Garg 2012 , Halevy et al. 2012 , Keidel 1987 , Kilduff et al. 2010 , Pfeffer and Davis-Blake 1986 , Staw and Hoang 1995 . Finally, unlike other organizational contexts in which measuring performance involves significant subjectivity, in professional basketball, the measure of team performance-the number of games won-is objective.
Team Performance Number of Wins. A team's normal, regular NBA season includes 82 games. Because of a labor negotiation-shortened season, we excluded the data from 1998 from our analyses. This let us use the number of games each team won as a season-level indicator of team performance, with the resulting distribution of the variable, Won, being naturally bell-shaped, with a mean of 41 and a standard deviation of 12.9 for the 21 seasons in our sample. The most games any team won in a single season was 72 (the Chicago Bulls in 1995); the least was 11 (the Dallas Mavericks and Denver Nuggets in 1992 and 1997, respectively).
Knowledge/Playing Style. Prior research suggests that knowledge heterogeneity among a group or team's primary members will enhance their preparedness, force additional learning via what Pelled et al. (1999) refer to as task conflict, and have a positive effect on performance (e.g., Jackson 1989, Pelled et al. 1999) .
5 Thus, holding constant several team-and individual-level predictors of performance, we expect a team's composition to have a robust effect on its performance. Our measures of heterogeneity-team level as well as primary and secondary level-and our measure of RH capture variations in team composition with respect to players' experience with and knowledge of styles of play. In a context such as professional basketball, where new members have fairly similar amounts of experience, knowledge of different playing styles provides a representation of a player's information and expertise. If a heterogeneous knowledge base is associated with team performance, then analyses of the effects of the distribution of the players' experience with different styles of play provides an opportunity to assess this relationship.
Data and expert observations suggest that college conferences, which provide most players' most proximate and relevant job training, tend to have distinct styles of play. As one prominent college coach told us, "There are definitely distinct playing styles by conference." He explained that some conferences are known for their pressure defenses (e.g., the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC)), others are known for their execution of fast breaks (e.g., Pacific Ten (Pac-10)), and others are known for their physicality (Big East). He also indicated that conference-specific styles result from intense competition and within-conference mimicry. Imitation, in other words, occurs largely as a necessary response to competition. Thus, the coaching behaviors of some of the winningest coaches in college basketball history-Bob Knight (Indiana, 1971 (Indiana, -2000 and Gene Keady (Purdue, 1980 (Purdue, -2005 in the Big Ten and Dean Smith (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1961 Hill, -1997 and Mike Krzyzewski (Duke, 1980-present) in the ACC-have been imitated by their rivals, intensifying the similarity of playing styles within their conferences.
Thus, we used data on the college conferences in which NBA players played as our indicator of their style of play (see Heckman 2000 on the lasting effects of early knowledge acquisition). We are not arguing that all of the players from a conference play in a style that is characteristic of that conference; instead, we suggest that players from the same conference will have a strong understanding of the kind of play associated with that conference as a result of repeated exposure and coaching. Also, all that needs to be true for our operationalization to be useful is for teams within a conference to be more alike, on average, than teams between conferences. Statistically, we were able to verify a robust positive effect of conference heterogeneity among teams' primary players (see Table 2 , Model 2, and all models thereafter) on team performance.
Measuring Heterogeneity and RH Maximum heterogeneity characterizes a set of players having no overlap in their college conference play; minimum heterogeneity amounts to complete overlap in their conferences.
Team Heterogeneity. We determined team-level heterogeneity using information on the college conferences of all of the players on a team's roster. Specifically, we calculated team-level heterogeneity as T i t = 1 − j S j /N i t , where S j is the number of players on team i from conference j and N i t is the number of players on team i at time t. Team-level heterogeneity is a reverse-coded variant on the Herfindahl concentration index. Players who did not play on a U.S. college team before entering the NBA, either because they entered the NBA from high school or attended college outside the United States, were dropped from our sample. The results do not change significantly when we include these players and treat them as if they are all from the same conference or as if they are all from different conferences from one another and from all others on the team.
Within-Level Heterogeneity. To compute heterogeneity within levels, we first needed to define a team's primary and secondary levels. We considered several alternatives, including using only the starting five players or weighting a player's influence by his share of minutes played. The first alternative is problematic because several teams include a "sixth man" or "seventh man" as a primary player. Similarly, fewer than five players may make up a team's primary level, with many secondary-level players sharing the remaining playing time. Although the weighting alternative produced statistically significant results comparable to those reported below, it creates problems for our conceptualization and estimation of RH because it requires treating some players as partial members of both primary and secondary levels. In the end, we operationally defined players as primary if they played more than 1,800 minutes in the season (approximately 22 minutes per game, or two-thirds of a standard deviation above the average number of minutes played per game for all NBA players); everyone else was defined as secondary. We subjected this threshold to sensitivity analyses before computing heterogeneity in the primary and secondary levels and computing RH, and we found results that were not significantly affected by a range of 200 minutes upward and 300 minutes downward. A threshold approach allows for between-team variation in the number of primary players, which ranged from 2 to 8 with a mean of 4.7. We assess the robustness of the primary findings to this measurement feature after reporting the main results. We then computed within-level heterogeneity using the college conferences of the players making up each level, with primary-level heterogeneity calculated as P i t = 1 − j S j p /n i t 2 , where S j p is the number of primary-level players of team i from conference j and n i t is the total number of primary-level players of team i at time t. We computed secondary-level heterogeneity, S i t using the same conceptual logic.
Redundant Heterogeneity. RH captures the overlapping college conference experience among a team's primary and secondary players. If a primary player played in the Big Ten conference, for instance, one or more secondary players who also played in the Big Ten would constitute an instance of RH. To calculate a team's RH, we treated both primary and secondary levels as unique vectors with lengths equal to the number of college conferences. Vector elements then account for the number of primary or secondary players from the conference corresponding to the element. RH is the standardized dot product between the two vectors, or R i t = p · s /N i t , where p is the primary-level vector, s is the secondary-level vector, and N i t is a standardization term that equals the number of players on the roster for team i at time t.
6 A team will have zero RH when there is no overlap in the college conferences between players in the primary and secondary levels. Mathematically, maximum RH is equal to R = p × s and occurs when all of the players on a team come from the same college conference. No such cases existed in the data. Also, as noted, because RH appears alongside both team-level and primary-level heterogeneity in many of our models, a significant effect of RH will amount to covariation between RH and team performance that is orthogonal to the effects of other team composition variables. In other words, if RH reaches its theoretical maximum, it adds nothing to the effects of team-level heterogeneity.
Estimation and Control Variables
To test our main hypothesis, H1, we estimated a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models of the following form: Won i t = X i t−1 + Z i t + 1 T i t + 2 P i t + 3 S i t + 4 R i t + i , where Won i t is the number of wins out of 82 by team i over the course of season t. Our unit of analysis is therefore the team-season. The matrices X i t−1 and Z i t contain team-level time-varying covariates. The only difference between the covariates in the two matrices is the time at which they are measured. Matrix X i t−1 included several indicators of team performance measured for the preceding season; they served as controls for team quality and included per-minute averages, calculated across all team members, for points scored, offensive and defensive rebounds, turnovers, shooting percentage, and free throw percentage. By computing per-minute averages, we controlled for raw quality and for team efficiency. By comparison, Z i t included controls for several descriptive characteristics of the team during the focal season, including the team members' average height, average age (and the standard deviation of age; see Berman et al. 2002) , average draft selection number, and the total and team-specific experience of the current coach, measured in years.
Team-level heterogeneity, primary-level heterogeneity, secondary-level heterogeneity, and RH are captured by T i t P i t S i t , and R i t respectively. We added team composition measures to models iteratively to establish the independence of RH's effects. We were ambivalent about the effects of 1 and 3 (on T i t and S i t ) but expected 2 (on P i t ) to be positive, indicating a positive effect of primary-level heterogeneity on wins. We also expected 4 (on R i t to be positive, indicating a positive effect of RH on wins. Because RH offers no additional information when team heterogeneity reaches its theoretical minimum or when homogeneity reaches its theoretical maximum, a positive effect of RH depends on a significant and positive effect of primary-level heterogeneity (i.e., 2 > 0). In contrast, if primary-level heterogeneity negatively affects wins (i.e., 2 < 0), any advantage to RH should be captured entirely by team-level heterogeneity and would be indistinguishable from an effect of team heterogeneity alone.
We added a fixed effect for each team, represented by i , in the course of our robustness checks and discuss it in more detail following the main results. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for all of the variables in the analyses. Tables 2 and 3 report the results of all primary estimation models and robustness tests, respectively. Tables 4 and 5 include the results from our mechanism tests, H2-H4. Because of the panel structure of the data, we report robust standard errors that are clustered by team and that are heteroskedasticity consistent. Table 2 includes only the control variables. Although we do not fully discuss this model, the results are consistent with both our expectations and prior studies using basketball data (e.g., Berman et al. 2002) . Model 2 adds our measure of team-level heterogeneity. The results suggest a negative effect of team-level heterogeneity on wins. (Later we will show that this effect is spurious.) A one-standard-deviation increase in team heterogeneity equates to one fewer win over the course of a season. This effect is comparable in magnitude to an additional one and a half year's worth of team-specific coaching experience and is one-third the effect size of a standard-deviation change in a team's lagged shooting percentage, one of the most important predictors of a team's performance. We added primary-level heterogeneity to Model 3 and found a positive effect of primary-level heterogeneity on wins expected. A one-standard-deviation increase in primary-level heterogeneity amounts to 3.25 additional wins over the course of a season. The average NBA team wins 41 games, so this effect amounts to an 8% increase in games won. With one exception-the average age of a team's players-the effect of primary-level heterogeneity is the strongest predictor of wins in Model 3. The effect of team-level heterogeneity remains negative and significant in Model 3. Given the contrasting effects of team-level and primarylevel heterogeneity on wins in Model 3, it is possible that the observed negative effect of team-level heterogeneity ( 1 > 0) results entirely from secondary-level players. In other words, an optimal team composition might be one in which a team's primary members are completely heterogeneous and its secondary members are completely homogeneous, with no need for relatedness between the two levels. We tested this possibility in Model 4 before analyzing RH. The results show that the coefficient estimate on secondary-level heterogeneity was not significant (t = 0 50). These results offer prima facie support for a second possible explanation: that redundancy between levels (i.e., RH) is an important (and so far overlooked) property of group composition.
Results

Model 1 in
Model 5 in Table 2 tests the effect of RH directly, indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in RH amounts to an additional 1.50 wins over the course of a season, without diminishing the influence of primary level heterogeneity. Model 6 reintroduces team-level heterogeneity to test whether it is independent of RH. The effect of team-level heterogeneity is not significant ( 1 = −28 94 t = 3 11 in Model 3 versus 1 = −10 22, t = 0 84 in Model 6). Postestimation tests also confirm multicollinearity does not account for any of the effects in Model 6. 7 In the discussion section, we return to Model 6 to consider the spurious team-level effect in more detail. For now, we limit our focus to the two significant effects-for primary-level heterogeneity and RH-and assess their robustness. Then we test H2, H3, and H4.
The results of Models 5 and 6 suggest the possibility of a "sweet spot." Among NBA teams, performance is most strongly associated with a maximally heterogeneous set of playing styles among the primary players that is redundant with the heterogeneity of the secondary players.
The consistently larger sets of secondary players make it impossible to determine whether exact mirroring of the primary and secondary levels is optimal, although additional tests indicated that the associations between performance and both primary-level heterogeneity and RH are monotonically increasing, at least within the range of the observed data. The aggregate effect of a one-standarddeviation shift in both primary-level heterogeneity and RH, in the direction of the signs on each coefficient, equates to 4.4 additional wins over the course of a season, or a 10.7% increase in winning frequency for a team posting average performance. In a sport where one game can lead to a team advancing to the playoffs, with a chance to compete for the championship, these team-composition effects are significant, statistically and practically. Notes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by team. Coefficients for all controls in Table 2 models are included but not shown. + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; * * significant at 1%. 2) is run on a subset of data having lower (higher) than average redundancy. + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; * * significant at 1%.
Robustness Checks
We subjected the results in Model 5 to a series of additional tests and robustness checks. First, we addressed our assumption about the imprinting effect of the college (conference) experience on a player's knowledge. Underlying our measures of interpersonal heterogeneity, and by extension our measure of RH, is the argument that college conferences have an important and lasting effect on a player's understanding and knowledge about the game. We treated any amount of time spent in college as having an equivalent effect on a player. For Model 7 in Table 3 , we computed an alternative measure of RH that applies a linear weight to players' contributions to a team's measured RH. Instead of all players being represented by a 1 in the p and s vectors that underlie RH, players were represented by a fraction that corresponds to the number of years (one through four) they spent in college. If a player spent two years in college, for example, he would be represented in either the p or s vector by a value of 0.5 (two years divided by a possible four years).
The correlation between the original measure of RH and RH weighted is 0.94, indicating that most of the players spent four years in college. As expected, the mean value of RH weighted is slightly less than the mean value of RH. A comparison of Models 7 and 5 shows that the coefficient estimate of RH weighted is larger and more significant (Model 7: b = 10 22, t = 3 62 versus Model 5: b = 9 38, t = 3 44). This comparison offers support for conference imprinting and provides further validity to our use of college conferences to assess heterogeneity among players. For simplicity and consistency, and because it amounts to a more conservative test, we used the original, nonweighted measure of RH in all remaining models. Second, the observed effect of RH on the number of wins could be due to differences in the quality of college conferences. For instance, were an NBA team to have five players from the ACC-one of college basketball's most dominant conferences-with one in an otherwise heterogeneous primary level and the other four in the secondary level, the sheer number of quality players might lead to positive performance that resembles our generalized conception of RH. To account for this possibility, we included 33 count variables that capture the number of players on a given NBA team during a given season from each of the 33 college conferences that are represented in our data. Although space considerations led us to suppress the coefficient estimates for these 33 additional variables, Model 8 shows that the effects of primary-level heterogeneity and RH are unaffected.
Next, because our threshold approach forces betweenteam variation in the number of their primary players, we wanted to guard against the possibility that these numbers drive the RH effect. Thus, we included a control for the number of primary players for every team-year observation. 8 We also found several instances in which the number of secondary players was significantly larger than average, even after controlling for the number of primary players. A thorough investigation of the data indicated that these observations are due to heavy trading years. For example, if a team trades several players during the course of a season, both their roster and, by way of our threshold approach, the number of their secondary players will be larger than normal. To account for this infrequent occurrence, we assigned a dummy variable, retool, equal to 1 for a team-year observation when the number of players on the roster was greater than 19, the mean team size plus one standard deviation. The data contained 97 instances of retooling, which we expected to be negatively related to team performance, as heavy trading creates significant disruptions in teams. Model 9 included these two additional variables. Having one additional primary player, i.e., someone who played more than 1,800 minutes in a season, led to 1.63 additional wins. This may be a "superstar" effect (see Ethiraj and Garg 2012) , in which more star players translate into better team performance. The effect of the retool dummy is negative and significant, as expected. Most importantly, the effects of primary-level heterogeneity and RH are robust to these additions.
Model 10 in Table 3 includes a fixed effect, i , for each of the 30 teams in the panel to adjust for time-invariant components of team quality. Thus, coefficient estimates in Model 10 account for within-team effects. Model 11 adds an autoregressive framework-in the form of a Prais-Winsten autoregressive type 1 (AR(1)) model-to capture and adjust for autocorrelation, given the panel nature of the data and the periodic occurrence common in sports and organizational contexts of multiyear team dominance (e.g., the Chicago Bulls during much of the 1990s) or deference (e.g., the Dallas Mavericks in the same time frame). Using a Prais-Winsten AR(1) model, as opposed to including a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of a regression, does not require dropping an entire time period of data.
9 Results of the fixed effects and fixed effects AR(1) models remain consistent with prior models' results.
Mechanism Tests
The remaining models, 12.1, 12.2, and 13 in Table 4 and 14.1 and 14.2 in Table 5 , test H2, H3, and H4 and are designed to investigate some (though not necessarily all) of the possible pathways linking RH to performance. Hypothesis 2 states that RH should counter the process of homogenization and slow the decay of the positive effect of primary-level heterogeneity on wins. We assessed H2 using a split-sample approach, 10 with Models 12.1 and 12.2 using observations in which RH is below and above the sample mean, respectively. The important predictors in these models are primary-level heterogeneity, weighted team experience as measured in Berman et al. (2002), 11 and the interaction between then. As we noted above, research (Carpenter 2002 , Harrison et al. 1998 has found that the effect of interpersonal heterogeneity on performance typically decays as an organization's and group members' collective experience increases. We suggest that this occurs because heterogeneous individuals begin to think and act like one another (i.e., they homogenize), thereby undermining heterogeneity's advantages. Thus, we expect that in low RH teams, the interaction between primary-level heterogeneity and team experience will be negative and significant (as the main effect of primarylevel heterogeneity is positive). In high RH teams, H2 predicts that experience will have less of an effect on the relationship between heterogeneity and wins: the interaction effect should be smaller or not significant. The results of Models 12.1 and 12.2 support H2: for teams with greater than average RH, team experience has no effect on the association between primary-level heterogeneity and wins.
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that RH will reduce the severity of a shock or a disruption to a primary level's personnel. As with many groups and organizations, team performance in the NBA should be negatively affected when a key player becomes less effective, either by leaving the team, getting injured, or experiencing any event that decreases his performance. For every team-year observation, we assigned a dummy variable, primary-level shock, equal to 1 when the number of primary players decreases; this led to approximately 22% of all observations receiving a 1. Model 13 includes both the dummy variable and an interaction between the dummy and RH. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant, supporting H3. Although a team with zero RH will lose an average of 5.5 additional games per year after a shock to the primary level, the same shock results in only 0.86 fewer wins for a team with the median level of RH.
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Finally, H4 states that RH may affect team performance indirectly via a direct effect on team cohesion. To test H4, we followed the approach of Halevy et al. (2012) to compute team "cooperation and coordination" in the NBA. (See their paper for details on this measure.) Coordination and cooperation is an aggregate measure of a team's (standardized) assists, turnovers (reverse-coded), defensive rebounds, and field goal percentage. Halevy et al. (2012) argued that these four measures specifically capture intragroup coordination and cooperation more than any others.
We expected that cooperation and coordination would mediate the positive effects of RH on wins, and the regression models in Table 5 support a mediation hypothesis. The leftmost model replicates Model 5 from Table 2 to serve as a baseline. Model 14.1 regresses each of the covariates in Model 5 on the measure of cooperation and coordination. Both primary-level heterogeneity and RH have positive and significant effects. Model 14.2 includes cooperation and coordination as a regressor and offers evidence of partial mediation. The effect of RH on wins in Model 14.2 is significantly weakened, although it remains significant at the 0.05 level; this is consistent with partial mediation. The results of a Sobel-Goodman test (Sobel 1982) indicate that coordination and cooperation mediated approximately 41% of RH's effect on wins.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our aim in this research has been to add to our understanding of the relationship between group and organizational composition and performance. Specifically, we hoped to demonstrate the importance of a new construct, redundant heterogeneity, that would add to the impact of interpersonal homogeneity and heterogeneity, highlighting the association between the composition of a group's personnel and its performance. Unlike homogeneity and heterogeneity, RH's effects are realized between various levels of a group, team, or organization. By demonstrating how RH can allow a group to experience the benefits of interpersonal heterogeneity, we hope that this paper provides a previously overlooked emphasis on structure to research on group and organizational composition.
Data from the NBA indicated that RH has a positive effect on team performance. In addition, we have been able to identify three reasons why RH is useful: it fosters and preserves the positive effects of interpersonal heterogeneity on performance, it diminishes the negative effects of turnover of a team's primary members, and it boosts team performance indirectly via its positive influence on team cohesion. Thus, one of our primary contributions has been to demonstrate how the benefits of heterogeneity among an organization's personnel can be augmented when groups exhibit RH. We hope that this moves the focus of future research beyond singular failure points of the homogeneity-heterogeneity trade-off to include the additional information that RH offers.
We also suggest that groups and organizational researchers might seek additional opportunities to embed structural considerations into their discussions and analyses of interpersonal heterogeneity and homogeneity. Consider, for example, our empirical result showing that the positive effect of team-level heterogeneity on performance was spurious (Model 6): although our research setting limits the implications of this result, adding RH to models predicting wins led to the previously negative and significant effect of team-level heterogeneity becoming nonsignificant. This suggests that only a particular kind of organizational homogeneity-cross-level homogeneity in an organization with two redundant levels-is beneficial. If we had not measured and included RH, the results of our analysis could have been misinterpreted as supporting (erroneously) a claim that optimal team structure combines heterogeneity among people in primary roles with homogeneity among people in secondary ones. This is not the case. Indeed, it appears that realizing the benefits of heterogeneity among people in the primary level depends on matching their heterogeneity with the composition of people in the secondary level.
Scope Conditions and Additional Considerations
Because research has not considered RH, highlighting the conditions that are necessary for observing its effects is important. We have noted several already but will attempt to be more comprehensive here. The first condition concerns the kinds of organizations and groups in which RH might be created and maintained. Like most studies, we are limited in our ability to make general comments because of our single empirical context. Nevertheless, we suggest that our setting is similar to many kinds of organizations and groups (see also Berman et al. 2002 , Keidel 1987 . Given their inherent multilevel structures, research and professional organizations-academia, medicine, law, and consulting, for instance-are perhaps the closest analogs, leading us to expect that RH's positive effects should also be observable in these settings. We are equally interested, however, in identifying RH and its effects in groups and organizations with varying configurations. For example, although we suggested that the effects of RH are contingent on an organization having hierarchical distinctions, simple redundancy might affect performance in "flat organizations" (Worthy 1950) as well. Indeed, as more organizations move from traditional hierarchies to flat structures, being able to identify natural fault lines that can foster redundancy would be an important theoretical and empirical contribution. In these instances, RH might be measured using nonhierarchical but horizontal divisions (e.g., departments). Because our present theorizing depends on the importance of hierarchy, we hesitate to make claims about the generalizability of RH to these cases but leave it to future research to examine this possibility.
Alternative organizational forms might also stimulate a second scope condition and associated avenue for future inquiry. In our analysis of basketball teams, we limited our attention to players who presumably identified with the same goals, i.e., to play basketball well and win. 14 We did not measure RH, for example, between players and people who are responsible for marketing or sales. As a result, our ability to make claims about the role of RH in groups and organizations that have multiple goals and/or exceptionally differentiated tasks is limited (Fishbach and Dhar 2005) . This limitation, however, does not imply that RH cannot exist or cannot produce similar effects in these contexts. Although achieving some of the advantages of RH may be difficult-an NBA team's marketing representatives cannot substitute for playerssome of the other benefits of redundancy, e.g., overall group cohesion, may be within reach. Future research might analyze whether the effects (and which effects) of RH hold when distinct organizational or group levels pursue differentiated tasks.
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A third scope condition relates to a common and real concern about generating and maintaining redundant systems, be they biological, electronic, or social, i.e., whether the costs of redundancy exceed its benefits. Generating redundancy in computer networks, for instance, means maintaining additional components that, in the course of normal operation, have no effect on the network's performance. In biological systems, unique cells often fulfill redundant functions to protect the integrity of the system from the deletion of any one cell, even though maintaining those additional cells requires additional energy. In groups and organizations, redundancy requires personnel. Few organizations could be expected to hire redundant employees and then, like redundant switches in a computer circuit, allow them to sit idly until they are needed. Our results indicate, however, that unlike computer and biological systems, RH is about more than protecting an organization from periodic shocks. That RH facilitates group cohesion and slows the decay of the benefits of heterogeneity implies that its effects are qualitatively different from redundancy in electronics and biology. Quantifying these benefits, and the costs associated with generating and maintaining RH, is a particularly interesting avenue for future inquiry.
A final consideration involves the possible downsides of RH and how the effects of RH might wax and wane with changes in environmental and competitive conditions. Innovation research (e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990) might question whether RH is most useful during times of incremental or radical change. By promoting and helping to maintain the positive effects of heterogeneity, RH should enable groups and organizations to forestall the rigidity of homogeneous collectives. Despite this virtue, however, RH may also be well suited to reproduce heterogeneity that was present in a previous period. By encouraging the maintenance of existing diversity, RH might lead to harmful effects in the long term. How RH would either prepare or hinder an organization during periods of radical change thus remains to be seen.
For now, RH provides a readily observable solution for overcoming the potentially negative consequences of diversity. Implementing its structure may hold considerable promise for the functional improvement of inefficient teams and organizations.
Endnotes
1 An anonymous reviewer noted that conflict may be a fourth basic problem. Although conflict has been a major focus of diversity research, we view it as an important mechanism that both causes and results from the three basic failures. For instance, interpersonal conflict often leads to individual exit and turnover, and conflict is also a frequent by-product and/or cause of fragmentation. In addition, a desire to avoid conflict encourages homogenization; even when A and B disagree, A may opt to remain silent or feign agreement. 2 Social network researchers have argued that individuals must maintain strong, nonredundant social ties beyond their group to attain optimal performance (e.g., Reagans et al. 2004, Zou and Ingram 2013) . Although this arrangement may help to preserve short-run heterogeneity, research has demonstrated how difficult this is. Thus, over time, group members tend to interact more with in-group members and less with outgroup members (Katz 1982) . For instance, Polzer et al. (2002) suggested that greater interpersonal congruence, i.e., how much group members see other group members as others see them, is essential for fostering a positive relationship between individual heterogeneity and group performance. We suspect that this relationship is particularly important in the short term and that interpersonal congruence may also be an important antecedent of homogenization. 3 In an extension of our empirical analyses, we assessed differences between direct substitution versus a more generalized "preservation of knowledge." In many instances, direct substitution is unnecessary-for example, there is no reason to promote a junior faculty member to preserve the knowledge of a departing senior member. That RH groups are better equipped to preserve the total cache of a group's, team's, or organization's knowledge should render these groups more robust. 4 This logic may hold horizontally as well as vertically; i.e., the existence of knowledge-based subgroups should also lessen the likelihood that disparity-based subgroups fragment. 5 We acknowledge that other dimensions (e.g., race and age) contribute to heterogeneity among players; we control for many of these differences. 6 Results are consistent when N is removed from the denominator and included as a separate covariate. 7 The tolerance values-measured as the reciprocal of the variance inflation factor, a standard measure of collinearity-of team heterogeneity, primary group heterogeneity, and RH are 0.55, 0.84, and 0.54, respectively, all of which are well above the 0.10 threshold for concern advocated in Kutner et al. (2004) . 8 In the models shown, we include this additional control as a continuous variable. In a model not shown, we also fit the control as a series of dummies, or a spline. There was little loss of information in using the continuous variable approach. 9 A Durbin-Watson test on the untransformed model confirms the presence of autocorrelation (h = 1 29), which is well accounted for using the AR(1) transformation (h = 1 81). 10 Although using a split sample, as opposed to a three-way interaction, makes interpretation easier, results are consistent for the three-way interaction between primary-level heterogeneity, team experience, and RH. 11 Berman et al. (2002, p. 21 ) computed weighted team experience "by assessing how many years of experience each player had on a specific team at the end of a season. Years of playing team experience was weighed by the minutes played in games in that season by that player, and an average was then calculated for each team-year." They found that collective team experience is an important predictor of team performance and that the effect of collective experience diminishes as experience approaches a maximum (empirically speaking) value. 12 The lack of significance on the primary-level heterogeneity term in Model 12.2 does not imply that the main effect is not significant in this sample. A model run on the same data (i.e., observations with greater than average RH) without the interaction term establishes that the main effect is indeed present (b = −21 07 t = −2 47). This model is omitted from Table 4 but is available from the authors. Furthermore, the 0.00 coefficient on team experience in Model 12.2 also deserves additional explanation, as it is important to note that this is not a main effect. Instead, the coefficient indicates that, at the highest level of measured RH, the effect of experience approaches zero. This intriguing result has a logical explanation. Recall that the highest theoretical values of RH occur when all group members are homogeneous. Thus, Model 12.2's results suggest that experience is less important in highly homogeneous teams, which is consistent with arguments about the benefits-simpler coordination, faster movement down a learning curve, etc.-of homogeneity. This result also highlights the importance of Model 6, which establishes the independent effect of RH, holding constant team-level heterogeneity. 13 In an additional analysis we investigated whether direct (oneto-one) substitution is necessary for the effects in Model 13 (H3). To do this we computed a variant of RH where we only considered two players to be redundant if they played in the same conference and played the same position. This change has a dramatic effect on the distribution of RH values, shifting the median closer to zero as opportunities for redundancy are diminished. The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive but not significant. Similar results hold in the interaction term in Model 13; i.e., the coefficient is negative but not significant. These results imply that the substitution-related benefits of RH are about more than direct, one-to-one substitution; instead, they seem to capture a more generalized retention of knowledge.
